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Abstract
The reflection that followed the Toulouse 2001 accident has stressed the fact that
there was an urgent need for a coherent and trustable information about industrial
hazards. This is true for the public who needs to be informed about the surrounding
risks but it is also, and all the more, true for the industrial operators who have the
responsibility to assess the risk and take the necessary provisions to reduce it, the
workers who face the risk everyday and the competent authorities, in charge of the
control
With this context in mind, INERIS is developing a series of tools for the knowledge
management in the context of industrial major hazards. The aim is to make accessible
the right information to the right person at the right moment. For this purpose, it is
necessary to clearly analyze the needs of the different actors of industrial risks
management and then to propose the structure of the system that will support and
make the knowledge available.
This paper presents the results of this preliminary analysis. It describes the first
features of the system developed in the framework of this project, PRIMARSIK®, and
illustrates how it was built in a fully integrated approach ofknowledge management.
PRIMARISlf*is not only a way to make different models and data available but it is
also a way to provide the structure for future capitalization of the knowledge.
Keywords: Knowledge management, industrial hazard, risk assessment.
1. Introduction : Situation in France after the AZF accident
The AZF accident that occurred in Toulouse in September 2001 has led to a large
debate about risk management in and around industrial sites. Among the conclusions
of this debate was the evidence that knowledge was not enough shared among
stakeholders with a series of consequences. The report of the inquiry commission
leaded by the deputies F. Loos and J.Y. Le Déaut [1] mentions a loss of memory
resulting to an everyday acceptance of risk. The safety studies realised by plant
operators or, more often by consulting firms were often of poor quality and could lead
to very different results in comparable situations. The decisions were taken without a
real debate among the stakeholders : plant operators, populations, local communities,
state authorities. This lack of debate and of diffusion of the knowledge had the
consequence of reducing or falsify the perception of the industrial risk by the
population but also by local community representatives.
The Toulouse situation is not unique. In France, the proximity of urban zones
(housings, commercial activity) with industrial zones is common due to the historical
context. Initially build outside the cities, the plants were progressively circled by the
houses in a time when the legislation was not sufficient and was not imposing land
use restriction. The opposite also existed: plants newly build or, more often, modified
to increase their capacity in the middle of an existing city. With time an evolution of
the population also occurred. In the origin, the surrounding population was often
composed of people working in the hazardous plants, thus having some knowledge of
the industry and its dangers. Part of this population moved to more comfortable
places away from the industrial zones, and were replaced by people having no link
with the plant and no risk culture.
The legislation evolved but, in many circumstances, the local political or economic
pressure as well as the poor understanding of the risk by the local representatives, the
population and even sometimes the administration, led to the continuation of abusive
growth of the suburbs around the hazardous plants.
2. Cindynics analysis of the situation
G.Y. Kervern has developed a conceptual model (Figure 1) for the investigation of
hazardous situations generated by organisational deficiencies. This model states that a
hazardous situation can always be analysed in terms of values, rules, objectives,
models and data [2]. When the actors of the situation lack or experience differences
in one of these elements the situation presents a risk. It is qualified ofcindynogenic.
Epistemic (Models)Statistical (Data)Teleologic Déontologie (Rules)Axiolc
Figure 1 : The hazard hyper-space model (G.Y. Kervem) [2]
Using this model helps to understand the reasons of the AZF accident and its
dramatic consequences. Indeed, differences of values and objectives existed between
the industry, the population, the local and the national authorities. For example the
population demanded more information and possibilities to express its opinion
whereas the national authorities had the belief that the question was too complex to be
debated and that the elite of the republic could certainly find the most rational and
adequate solution. The industry and, somehow the local authorities were asking for
less obstacles to the economic growth in the plant and around them.
To face these differences, the rules were insufficient. Their requirements were not
clear enough, leading to divergences of interpretation. They were also not adapted to
the situation of the many cities where an hazardous industry was cohabitating with a
urban area.
The last deficiency concerned models and data. The report by F.Loos and J-Y.Le
Déaut was underlying the necessity to improve the knowledge of hazardous
substances and to improve the risk assessment methodologies [1]. It was also insisting
on the very broad variety of results obtained by the risk analysis of industrial plants.
The European project ASSURANCE [3] realised in the same period had shown that
for a same set of data about the same plant, the results of the risk analysis could vary
by a factor 5 in terms of distances of effect and by a factor 1000 in terms of
probability. This project was involving the top consulting firms and national risk
institutes of seven European countries. Part of these results could be attributed to the
lack of knowledge, the imprecision of models and the assumptions made to
compensate them.
From the previous paragraph it can be concluded that the situation in terms of
hazardous risk managements was cindynogenic. Progress had to be made for an
improvement and sharing of common values, rules, objectives, models and data.
The values reflect what is considered as essential by the stakeholders. The values
change slowly as the results of the general public debate and the evolution of the
society. The debate that followed the accident contributed to the reinforcing of a
common certitude that the management of risks around industrial sites could not be a
solely technical activity and that, as the most concerned were the population, and the
workers of the plant (who are often the same), they should be involved in a
democratic way. A common value was that making profits could not justify to let
risks uncontrolled. And, somehow, the question was too serious to be let in the sole
hands of the technical experts and the politicians.
The rules are the results of the legislative and regulatory process. They are the
formalisation and the implementation of the values. The debate that followed the
accident in Toulouse led to the voting of a new law (n° 2003-699) of July 30th 2003
[4] relative to the prevention of technological and natural risks and the compensation
of the damages.
The new law aims at reversing the effects of the past lack of knowledge or differences
in rules and values by introducing new rules and reducing the vulnerability around
industrial sites. The evolution of the legislation aims at reinforcing the democracy by
introducing a debate before the taking of decisions. Somehow this debate should also
reduce the divergence of objectives among the actors as it should bring the actors to
formulate common objectives in terms of risk reduction and control.
But the debate between the stakeholders only can work if its actors share common
models and data. Those are often the result of a scientific process. Their formalisation
and making accessible to the stakeholders is a typical knowledge management task
that will be described in the next paragraphs.
In fact, the objectives of making the knowledge available go beyond the need of
facilitating the debate. It also aims at making the risk assessment more efficient by
providing to the people in charge of this activity the necessary models and data. It
also aims at facilitating the comparison and interpretation of the results by the
stakeholders, and then, it enhances the transparency of the decision-making process.
3. What Knowledge management can bring
Knowledge Management is the process through which organizations generate value
from their intellectual and knowledge-based assets1. Knowledge management
recovers all the methods and techniques that can be used to make the knowledge
available and usable by those who pertain to the organisation.
The knowledge can be divided into two main categories : the explicit knowledge and
the tacit knowledge.
The first one is the knowledge that can be documented, the second one is the
knowledge that resides in the people's mind in a more or less formalised form. One of
the aims of knowledge management is to transform the tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge. A second one is to make the explicit knowledge accessible to people who
may benefit from it.
One of the first step of knowledge management can constitute in the formalisation of
expertise : making the expert tacit knowledge become an explicit knowledge
understandable by other people. This is what was done in INERIS with the writing of
the Q reports. These reports are a formalisation of the present knowledge of INERIS
experts on various subjects related with the management of major hazards. The
second step is to make this knowledge available to other potential users. This was
done by the diffusion of the Q reports on the web site of INERIS. Table I lists the
already available reference documents. The same number is under preparation at the
moment.
Yet, this was not sufficient as the knowledge required to assess and control risk and
to take decisions in a risk environment is not limited to literal knowledge.
The risk expert uses a large variety of models and data associated to the various steps
of risk assessment processes. To make these models, tools and data available to the
risk assessment community, INERIS is presently developing the resource platform
PRIMARISK® . It should be available to the public in the course of year 2006. The
next paragraphs describe the main features of this web platform and present its basic














list of the Q reference documents available on www.ineris.fr
Guide for the conception and operation of farm-produce storage capacities with regard to the fire
and explosion hazards
Pool fire
Lightning hazard in process plants
Modelling of a fire affecting aerosol generators
BLE VE - phenomenology and modelling of thermal effects
Important for safety elements
Risk analysis methods for industrial installations
Jet fire
Safety report of an industrial plant
Assessment of the performances of safety barriers
4. Structure of knowledge
The heart of the process leading to the decision making around industrial sites is the
risk assessment process.
It is structured as follows:
• Hazard identification;
• Description of the scenarios;
• Determination of the dose-response relationship;
• Estimation of the risk emission;
• Estimation of the exposition to risk;
• Risk evaluation.
Each of these steps requires that some knowledge be mobilised to produce the
expected results. Specialists of risk assessment, experts, implement this process for
the benefit of the community and the decision makers, who need to have a good
understanding of the process itself and of its different stages to be able to interpret
properly its results.
It requires also from them an initial understanding of these basic concepts : hazard,
risk, accident, severity, vulnerability, and of the general decision-making process
based on risk analysis.
5. Specific risk assessment processes: the example of the safety
report of industrial plants
Specific risk assessment processes are defined by the legislation, standards or state of
the art. At the end of its development, PRIMARISK® will describe several risk
assessment processes related to the main activity domains of INERIS. The first to be
implemented in PREVIARISK® is the safety report of a hazardous industrial plant (in
French : étude de dangers). It involves the following steps :
• Description of the plant;
• Identification of the hazardous pieces of equipment;
These reports are prensently available only in French. The title was translated into english for the
sake of the present paper.
• Selection of the pertinent equipment;
• Risk analysis;
• Identification of the safety barriers;
• Assessment of the consequences of accidents;
• Definition of the safety control and requirements for the safety management
system.
Each of these steps mobilises a specific knowledge.
The description of the process is explicit but the understanding of which models,
tools and data to use is more of a tacit type. The expertise lies in the ability to use the
right model for a given hazardous situation. It lies also in the capacity to understand
the results of the process.
Therefore, the first step of knowledge description involved the description of the risk
assessment process. To ease the understanding, a logical decomposition was decided.
The risk assessment process is composed of steps. Each step involves the fulfilment
of tasks.
In PRIMARISK®, each steps is described in terms of objectives. The relevant
legislative texts are given together with other reference text, when they exist. Then
the tasks are listed. Each of them is described and linked with useful resources.
The resources can be of three main types :
• Local resources : PRIMARISK® lists the elements of information that the
person in charge of the risk assessment has to obtain from the plant operator
such as the maps or process instrumentation diagrams.
• General resources : these are the resources available elsewhere that the user
should consults to obtain useful information. Most of these resources are
available online from other web sites. Among these are databases,
documentation etc.
• Specific resources available directly from PRIMARISK®: These are tools and
databases that were developed specially for being made accessible through
PRIMARISK®.
Figure 2 shows the general structure of PRIMARISK®. The core system was
implemented on a database and establishes the link with classical web pages and







Figure 2 : general structure of PRIMARISK
1.1. Risk analysis methods and support tools
Risk analysis is an essential step of the safety report elaboration. Depending on the
type of activity considered, different risk analysis methods can be used.
PRIMARISK® provides descriptions of some methods as well as support tools, check
lists, tables etc.
A decision support tool for the choice of an appropriate method is also proposed. The
selection involves the type of process to be analysed, the complexity of the method,
the depth of the analysis or the integrated aspect of the analysis.
A second development step will lead to the building of a complete risk analysis
support tool dedicated to the management of the data collected during risk analysis.
This tool makes use of the bowtie representation of the accident scenarios, which was
promoted by the European project ARAMIS [5].
The associated risk analysis process begins with the identification of the hazardous
equipments in the plant. ARAMIS provides lists of hazardous equipments3 together
with the critical events they can provoke. For each critical event, the method also
proposes a generic fault tree and event tree that serves as initial basis for the risk
analysis. A database with the hazardous equipments, their descriptions, and the
associated fault trees and event trees was build in PRIMARISK®. It can already serve
as a support for risk analysis before the building of the future tool.
A next step involves the identification of safety functions and safety barriers. A
database with typical safety barriers for different types of activities, BADORIS4, was




Once the safety barriers are identified, their efficiency is assessed so that finally the
frequency of the accident scenario may be assessed. This step has revealed to be
relatively difficult because of a general lack of data about initiating events or
reliability of the safety barriers. Producing such data could be an objective assigned to
a knowledge management tool such as PRIMARISK®. This goal will be discussed in
paragraph 11.
1.2. Tools for the modelling of the consequences
The tools presently proposed in PRIMARISK® are mostly mathematical models for
the assessment of the consequences of accidents. Most of them were developed as a
result of INERIS research programs. They are dedicated to the modelling of physical
phenomena such as fire, explosion or BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour
explosion). Progressively PRIMARISK® will provide a complete set of tools for the
description of all the relevant phenomena that can be associated to major hazards.
Beyond, PRIMARISK® also aims at providing the expertise in the selection of the
appropriate model for a given situation. A decision support tool was developed. It
classifies the various models according to the type of phenomena, the physical state
of the substance involved, the type of effect of interest. For each configuration, a
pertinence level is defined together with the validity limits of the model and most
typical assumptions.
1.3. Chemical databases
The major accidents, as they are defined in the SEVESO directive always involve
hazardous chemicals. The modelling of accident consequences implies that the
physical properties of the substances involved in the accident be known.
PRIMARISK contains its own chemical substances database which directly provides
the needed data to the models. Of course this database is not exhaustive and it will
evolve permanently during years. This will be done by letting the possibility to
certified users to enter their own data and share them with the rest of the users. A
validation process is being devised to avoid the filling of the database with erroneous
data. However, these aspects of content validation are one of the key aspects of the
success of such a project. They will be further discussed in paragraph 11.
1.4. Decision support and land use planning
One of the aims of making the knowledge available is to allow for a better debate
among the stakeholders. To achieve this goal, the basis of the land use planning
decisions should be explained. This is somehow done in the general knowledge
section where relevant articles explain the structure and objectives of the legislation
and legislative process. But the system could be used further as a true support tool for
the debate between the technical stakeholders and the public actors. Multicriteria
decision systems could be proposed to establish the priorities in land-use planning,
for example. The system would not provide a predefined decision grid but rather help
the users defining their own and, by this way, progressing in their definition of risk
acceptance.
GIS tools for the representation of risk zones around industrial sites could be also
proposed. Such tools have been developed in the framework of the ARAMIS project.
6. Evolution towards a true knowledge management
The elements presented in the previous paragraphs, the structure and the content of
the resource platform constitute a first step towards the implementation of a
knowledge management system for the control of major accidental hazards. Yet the
knowledge management approach could go far beyond, as many authors agree to
consider that information technologies and web based tools are only a part of the KM
philosophy. In fact knowledge management could aim at a permanent capitalisation
of the knowledge of all the actors of risk management who all are potential future
users of PRIMARISK®
Figure 3 represents the steps of the evolution towards a full knowledge management
tool. The first step, the formalisation of expert knowledge corresponds to the writing
of the Q reports. The second step, the development of tools and databases from this
initial knowledge is the first aim of PRIMARISK®. The next step involves the sharing
of knowledge by future users. It could begin by the sharing of data: data about
chemical substances, data about hazardous equipment, modelling hypotheses. This
would be relatively easy to do on a technical aspect but would raise a series of legal
issues about responsibility, intellectual property and the control of the quality of the
data.
A further step would be to propose the users to provide the system with information
about accidents or equipment failure with the objective of producing the lacking data
for probabilistic risk analysis. Accident databases exist such as the European MARS5
or the French ARIA6. Their feeding is done by the authorities on the base of
mandatory declaration by the plant operators. Yet the useful information is often not
available, and no quantitative treatment of the data is possible. Going further and
proposing a structure for voluntary declaration would allow to obtain more
information. The missing data are frequencies of initiating events, failure rates of
safety barriers and safety integrity levels as defined by the IEC 61508 [6] and IEC
61511 [7] standards. Obtaining this information would require to process the raw data
produced by the users. Information about the damages caused by accidents would
also be useful to assess the potential impact of future accidents. But the way will
probably be long before being able to get voluntary declaration of accidents by the




First stage of formalisation : from mind to documents
Explicit knowledge
(Q reports)
2 Second stage of formalisation : from documents to tools
Tools Databases




A Fourth stage : processisng user's data to enrich the database
Users Raw user data and
experience
(accident, failure)
Figure 3 : four stages of the implementation of a knowledge management system
7. Obstacles to the development of an open knowledge management
approach
Making knowledge available is not as straightforward as it may appear for numerous
reasons. Among the various question it raises, one of the most critical is related with
the responsibility and the validation of the contents. When a user visits the site of a
reference institution such as INERIS, he expects to find trustable and validated
information that he will be able to use to control the risk in his plant or system.
Therefore, the process of formalisation of tacit knowledge of experts has to be
controlled in such a way that only stabilised and proofed information be made
available. This, somehow, hinders the free feeding of the platform by a community of
experts and, later, by a community of users. Methods and procedures have to be
developed to validate the content and guaranty to future users a safe use of the data.
Legal aspects also have to be considered. Different points should be examined.
- the property of the information provided to the system by the users;
the responsibility of the users or that of the system operator in case of
abusive use of the data;
- the confidentiality of the data.
Other issues are raised by such a system and are somehow related to the structure of
responsibility around Seveso sites and the position of the various actors. The
legislation requires that the plant operator do a risk analysis of the plant and produce
a safety report. The competent authorities assess the validity of the report. At this
step, the report can be accepted. Or, if it is considered as incomplete, complementary
studies can be demanded. The administration also has the possibility to ask for an
independent expertise on the validity of the risk assessment. This kind of third party
expertise is increasing regularly as the administration has more and more difficulties
in assessing documents that have become relatively complex. Very often the
conclusions of this expertise are taken as the reference by the administration, which
raises questions about the interest of the first step of risk assessment. Somehow,
having a system like PRIMARISK® would be a solution for reducing the need of such
third party expertise. The administration would have all the elements for assessing the
validity of the initial document. But it also raises new risks.
The legislation do not impose the tools that should be used at the different steps of
risk assessment and many models are currently available and used by plant operators
and consulting firms, who also have developed their own tools. If the conclusions of
the debate following the accident in Toulouse had insisted on the variability of the
results obtained in the risk assessment process, the origin of this variability was more
attributed to a lack of expertise in the use of the tools rather than to the poor quality of
the tools themselves.
What will happen when the administration have reference tools at hand ? Will the
studies made by alternative models be accepted ? What kind of information should be
given to prevent that PRIMARISK® becomes the unique reference system ? All these
questions still have to be assessed and answer clearly before the final dissemination
of PRIMARISK®.
More generally, the development of this tool may imposes to redefine the position of
the expert, the administration, the plant operator and the other stakeholders in their
relation to knowledge and the use of this knowledge for risk management.
8. Conclusion
The debate that followed the accident in Toulouse on September 21st 2001 has
underlined the necessity of a better sharing of knowledge among the various actors of
risk management around hazardous industrial plants. To answer such a necessity, a
four stage knowledge management scheme is proposed. The first stage involves the
formalisation of the expert knowledge into documents made accessible on the
INERIS web site. The second stage is dedicated to the conversion of these documents
into tools and databases to constitute the base of a resource platform : PRIMARISK .
The third and fourth stage involve the sharing of knowledge by the potential
PRIMARISK® users : administration, plant operators, consulting firms. At first by
making their data available, and then by feeding the system with more sensitive
information such as exemplary accident or, what may be more useful, incident
description or data about equipment failures, allowing for a processing of these
elements and the production of data needed for the risk analysis.
Implementing this knowledge management scheme raises a number of difficulties
mostly related to the position of the actors of risk management, future users of
PRIMARISK®. These questions are relative to the legal responsibility induces by the
providing of such resources, the risk of defining a monolithic reference that would be
considered as the only valid approach by the administration, the difficulty of making
users share information about a sensitive subject such as risk. Somehow, the
implementation of PRIMARISK® and its use question the role of experts and more
generally of the actors involved in the risk management process.
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